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Abstract 
“Travelling in time,” a central feature of episodic memory is severely affected among 
individuals with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with two opposite effects: vivid traumatic 
memories are unorganized in temporality (bottom-up processes), non traumatic personal memories 
tend to lack spatio-temporal details and false recognitions occur more frequently that in the general 
population (top-down processes). To test the effect of these two types of processes (i.e. bottom-up 
and top-down) on emotional memory, we conducted two studies in healthy and traumatized 
adolescents, a period of life in which vulnerability to emotion is particularly high. Using negative 
and neutral images selected from the international affective picture system (IAPS), stimuli were 
divided into perceptual images (emotion generated by perceptual details) and conceptual images 
(emotion generated by the general meaning of the material). Both categories of stimuli were then 
used, along with neutral pictures, in a memory task with two phases (encoding and recognition). In 
both populations, we reported a differential effect of the emotional material on encoding and 
recognition. Negative perceptual scenes induced an attentional capture effect during encoding and 
enhanced the recollective distinctiveness. Conversely, the encoding of conceptual scenes was 
similar to neutral ones, but the conceptual relatedness induced false memories at retrieval. However, 
among individuals with PTSD, two subgroups of patients were identified. The first subgroup 
processed the scenes faster than controls, except for the perceptual scenes, and obtained similar 
performances to controls in the recognition task. The second subgroup group desmonstrated an 
attentional deficit in the encoding task with no benefit from the distinctiveness associated with 
negative perceptual scenes on memory performances. These findings provide a new perspective on 
how negative emotional information may have opposite influences on memory in normal and 
traumatized individuals. It also gives clues to understand how intrusive memories and 
overgeneralization takes place in PTSD. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Time and episodic memory in PTSD 
 
 Episodic memory enables mental time travel in subjective time (Tulving 2002, 2005) and 
this “special, and unique relationship” of episodic memory to time, “surprisingly, is not widely 
known […] allowing one to re-experience, through autonoetic awareness, one’s own previous 
experiences” (Tulving, 1972). His statement has previously been expressed by H. G. Wells, in 
“The Time Machine” (1898) who writes: “You are wrong to say that we cannot move about in 
Time. For instance, if I am recalling an incident very vividly I go back to the instant of its 
occurrence: I become absent-minded, as you say. I jump back for a moment.” John Locke 
(1690/1975) has stated a long time ago that memory is the power “to revive perceptions, which it 
has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.” 
Episodic memory is pivotal in autobiographical memory formed of different types of 
representations, from general knowledge about oneself (semantic component) to very specific 
personal events (Conway 2001). The way one remembers our past may be altered by self-
conception (Wilson and Ross 2003) and reciprocally. Hence impairment in episodic memory of 
personal events may disrupt the sense of continuity and coherence of the self (Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Episodic memory can be severely affected in individuals with PTSD with 
two opposite effects. Traumatic memories arise suddenly without any effort of recollection and 
even against one’s effort to forget. These memories are unorganized in temporality and so vivid 
that the subject can feel he/she is actually reexperiencing the same event as the one that initially 
led to PTSD (bottom-up processes). Conversely, there is a trend to lose vividness and 
distinctiveness of other personal memories that become overgeneralized (top-down processes). 
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Moreover, some clinical studies have shown that false memories (i.e., “memories” of personal 
facts that never happened) are more numerous in that population compared to healthy subjects 
(Brennen et al., 2007). Similarly, laboratory studies have shown that false recognitions are more 
frequent in PTSD compared to healthy subjects (Jelinek et al., 2009).  
 One of the main symptoms of PTSD is the intrusive recollection of highly specific single 
details of the traumatic event, criterion B of the definition of PTSD in DSM-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) with the patient acting or feeling as if the traumatic events were 
recurring. Temporality is severely altered in the sense that “what surges up in consciousness is 
not the memory of a ‘‘traumatic feeling” but a new feeling experienced in the present” (James, 
1890). It initially takes the form of an unrelated set of sensory-perceptual details that only over 
time may come to be associated with a more abstract general event or lifetime period (van der 
Kolk and Fisler, 1995; Howe, 1997). According to Janet (1894) ‘‘traumatic memory” repeats the 
past, while ‘‘narrative memory” narrates the past as past. More recently, Brewin and 
collaborators suggest that memories of a personally experienced traumatic event can be stored in 
two different representational formats (Brewin et al., 1996; Hellawell and Brewin, 2004). One 
format consists of a memory available for verbal communication, which can be retrieved either 
automatically or using deliberate and strategic processes, i.e. top-down processes. The second 
format includes trauma-related dreams and ‘‘flashbacks” and emanates from low-level perceptual 
processing of the traumatic scene via sensory information that receives little conscious 
processing, i.e. bottom-up processes. Visual imagery is predominant in traumatic memories, 
although other sensory-perceptual details may be the first trigger. They are commonly associated 
with intense personal distress. A patient has written that “fragments of horrific experiences are 
captured in the “brain’s eye”. ... Those pictures ...  are frozen in time. On any given day ...the 
pictures come to life again – the horror of what happened is once again very real, and it is 
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happening all over again”. A young child with PTSD came to our consultation asking us “to cure 
her eyes ... to wipe visions that was imposed to her”. A study using fMRI (Yang et al., 2004) 
indicated that patients with PTSD, compared to healthy subjects, both having experienced an 
earthquake, showed significantly greater activation in posterior visual (occipital) areas when 
evocating mental imagery about the trauma. Heightened proneness to form false memories in 
some specific laboratory tasks has also been shown (Jelinek et al., 2009) particularly with visual 
cues. 
 
 
1.2 Emotion and memory 
 
It is now well established that emotion influences memory formation (Buchanan, 2007). Most 
investigations have focused on how arousal (i.e., soothing or exciting effect of the stimulus) and 
valence (i.e., positive or negative) may interact with different processes, including attentional, 
perceptual, and conceptual processes (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006). Concerning explicit memory, 
there are two contrasting theories. The first proposes that emotion enhances recollective 
distinctiveness based on results showing that arousal increases memory vividness (Rimmele et 
al., 2011). Compared to words, perceptual stimuli, such as emotional pictures, seem more likely 
to elicit this recollection process. The second theory considers emotion as an organizational 
factor in memory that may enhance false memories related to the gist of the emotional target 
items. This conceptual relatedness hypothesis may be observed for both emotional words and 
pictures (Gallo et al., 2009). Although arousal is behind many significant changes in memory, 
from perception to consolidation (Mather and Sutherland, 2011), it has been clear for some time 
that the emotional valence of information also enhances memory, in a number of different ways. 
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Behavioral studies have revealed that negative compared to neutral emotion, may enhance 
memory for specific details and leads to vivid recollection (Mickley and Kensinger, 2008). 
Nonetheless, negative emotional pictures may also increase confusability in memory and lead to 
false recollection (Gallo et al., 2009). This discrepancy suggests that some properties, specific to 
the pictures, may influence the recollection process. 
More recently, two supplementary distinctions have been studied, perceptual versus 
conceptual processing, in addition to arousal and valence. These former types of processing refer 
to two distinct functional networks (Ritchey et al., 2011): processing perceptual emotional 
features relies particularly on an automatic pathway that includes the amygdale, while deep 
processing, focused on the meaning or interpretation of the emotional pictures, depends on 
prefrontal regions. These two distinct cortical networks overlap with those implicated in emotion 
generation: a bottom-up perception of aversive images and a top-down interpretation implicating 
conceptual understanding - including specific emotional state - of the emotional images (Ochsner 
et al., 2009).  
Results on emotional memory in adolescence are in line with results in adult data showing a 
more pronounced memory bias for negative valence, for both hits (recognition) (d'Acremont and 
Van der Linden, 2007; Krauel et al., 2009) and false alarms (Nelson et al., 2003). Yet, 
neuroimaging studies have revealed that, unlike adults, adolescents are influenced more by the 
emotional nature of the stimuli than by the attentional demands of the task (Blakemore, 2008). 
Hare et al. (2008) have also reported that adolescents show exaggerated amygdala activity 
relative to children and adults during an emotional inhibition task. Wang et al. (2008) reported 
greater emotional interference in executive functioning in adolescents compared to adults when 
performing an emotional oddball paradigm featuring a human expression (sad or neutral). The 
immature top-down control and an impaired regulation of emotion is often mentioned in the 
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literature (Galvan, 2010). This cognitive control of affective networks, enabling the coordination 
between the executive and emotional systems, undergoes gradual maturation during adolescence 
(Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). Hence, bottom-up perceptual and top-down conceptual processes 
implicated in emotion generation may differentially affect memory, and adolescence constitutes 
an appropriate model to examine this question.  
 
 
1.3 Emotion and episodic memory in PTSD  
 
Most theories about emotional memory are also valid for memory in PTSD. However, 
they may be inefficient to explain all specificities of emotional memory in that population. 
Studies about emotional memory in PTSD have tried to explain the origin of intrusive 
memories, whether in the form of “flashbacks” or not. Fewer studies have investigated 
specificities of episodic memory according to the arousal and valence of the material to 
remember, notwithstanding items were not directly linked to the trauma. Contrasting results 
may be explained notably by activation of different brain networks according to the 
prevalence of bottom-up or top-down processes.   
Different experimental designs have been used to study these different types of emotional 
memory. Concerning intrusive memories, according to fear conditioning models, PTSD is 
characterized by an exaggerated response of the amygdala to threat-related stimuli (St 
Jacques et al., 2011), hence of prevalent bottom-up processes. Less is known about the 
phenomenon of overgeneralization and false memories, particularly for emotional memories, 
which we will refer to as “numbing in time.” Performance on declarative memory tests with 
neutral stimuli has been found to be consistently impaired in PTSD (Brewin et al., 
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2007; Johnsen and Asbjornsen, 2008), although results are far more complex for emotional 
memories. Most studies found, among patients with PTSD, a threat-related memory bias 
characterized by a retrieval “advantage” for stimuli related to the trauma or for other specific 
threats compared to non-traumatic stimuli (Brewin, 2011; Golier et al., 2003). Hence, all 
types of visual or verbal materials that may be perceptively or semantically linked to the 
traumatic event may be differently encoded and recollected than any other material, even 
emotional. Additionally, this phenomenon can be accompanied by increasing false 
recognitions of verbal or pictorial negative material. This bias for trauma-specific stimuli is 
also observed in attentional tasks and may interfere with another concomitant processing, 
such as in the Stroop task (Yiend, 2010). Two mechanisms are traditionally evoked, although 
not contradictory: first a facilitated detection based on an over-reactivity to traumatic cues 
(vigilance-avoidance model) and, second, a difficulty disengaging attention from threatening 
stimuli (attention-maintenance model). However, two recent meta-analyses report 
inconsistent results (Cisler et al., 2011; Kimble, 2009) suggesting that only a part of the 
PTSD population demonstrates this bias. A third hypothesis may conciliate this apparent 
inconsistence focusing on the bottom-up and top-down attentional systems (Bardeen and 
Orcutt, 2011). High levels of stress may impair some aspects of the attentional control 
particularly those which are top-down regulated, especially inhibition processes (Pineles et al. 
(2007) and shifting, part of executive functioning. Hence, a prominent theoretical perspective 
proposed the top–down inhibition of the amygdala by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as a 
major mechanism that may be defective in PTSD. Bardeen and Orcutt (2011) reported greater 
difficulty to disengage from traumatic stimuli for individuals with prominent symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress. We can speculate that this deficit in attentional control or top-down 
process may affect memory.   
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Here, we examined this question by conducting two subsequent studies. The first study was 
conducted on a typical population of adolescents with the objective to assess top-down and 
bottom-up processes in emotion generation and their effect on attention and memory. This may 
enable us to validate our methodology and evaluate the “normal” influence of two different 
emotional processing: perceptual (or detailed-oriented) and conceptual (or based on the general 
meaning of the information). In the second study, we investigated these processes in patients with 
PTSD matched with controls, by distinguishing two subgroups, one with an attentional bias and 
another with no significant attentional interference, and their differential impact on memory. Two 
sets of negative emotional pictures were chosen from the internal affective picture system (IAPS; 
Lang et al., 2008) based on differences in subjective ratings relative to what induced the emotion, 
either perceptual details or a general interpretation of the scene. We studied both memory phases, 
i.e., encoding and explicit (recognition) retrieval.  
 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
2.1.1 Typically developing adolescents 
 
Sixty-four typically developing adolescents (39 girls and 25 boys) completed the tests. All the 
adolescents met the inclusion criteria: being free from neurological, psychiatric and learning 
disorders, as well as intellectual disability, receiving no medication and being native French 
speakers. We obtained informed consent from parents and assent from children, in line with the 
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guidelines of the relevant ethics committees. They were recruited by means of invitation letters 
sent to several junior high schools in the Calvados (France). Mean age was 13.6 ± 1.13 years 
(163.4 ± 13.6 months). There was no significant age difference between the boys and girls (boys: 
164.64 ± 13 months; girls: 161.2 ± 13.7 months). Adolescents performed within the normal range 
on the Block Design (11.2 ± 2.5) and Vocabulary subtests (11.8 ± 2.9) of the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1996), showing normal nonverbal 
reasoning and semantic knowledge. 
 
2.1.2 Adolescents with PTSD 
 
We compared 25 patients (age: 193.93±16.5) to 24 healthy controls (age: 186.67±13.49) 
matched on age (p=0.18). Inclusion criteria were similar to the first part of this study (see above). 
In particular, patients received no psychotropic medication during the previous week and were 
free from other mental disorders including major depression. The positive diagnosis of PTSD 
(categorical approach) was assessed with the Structured Clinical Interview-Clinician Version 
(SCID-CV; First et al., 1996) and the dimensional approach with the Impact of Event Scale-
Revised (IES-R; Sundin ans Horowitz, 2002). All presented a chronic PTSD and were without 
traumatic stressor for at least one year. Patients were recruited through the University Hospital of 
Caen and from social centers of the departments of South Corsica, Northern area and Calvados 
(France). In order to explore the heterogeneity of performance in PTSD, we divided the group of 
patients in two, taking into account their performance on the neutral condition of the oddball 
paradigm (see Fig. 1 and 2). Thus, two subgroups of patients were identified: one subgroup with 
attentional performances significantly inferior to those of controls in the neutral conditions 
(PTSD-, N=12, age: 190±20.47 months) and another subgroup with similar or superior 
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performances compared to controls (PTSD+, N=13, age: 197.53±11.42 months). The two 
subgroups of patients did not differ significantly for the IES-R score (p=0.3), scores on the Block 
Design (p=0.8) and Vocabulary subtests (p=0.53) of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale (WISC-III; 
Wechsler, 1996, WAIS III, Wechsler, 2000).  
    +++ Insert Fig 1 and 2 Here +++ 
 
 
2.2 Material 
 
Three sets of photographs were selected from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2008): 36 neutral, 30 
moderately negative qualified as “perceptual photographs” (i.e. emotion induced by perceptual 
details) and 30 moderately negative qualified as “conceptual photographs” ‘(i.e. emotion induced 
by the interpretation of the scene). The perceptual or conceptual nature of emotional pictures was 
previously tested among 20 students aged 20.25 to 23 years (mean age: 21.32 ± 1.15 years or 
255.89 ± 13.80 months). For each picture, students had to indicate on a 9 point scale if emotion 
was induced either by specific perceptual details or by the interpretation of the scene (1 point = 
mainly perceptual; 9 points = mainly interpretation). The perceptual photographs differed 
significantly from the conceptual ones (perceptual: 5.4 ± 2.9; conceptual: 6.8 ± 2.4, p<0.0001). 
Although there was no difference in valence between the “perceptual” and “conceptual” 
photographs (semantic: 2.93 ± 0.81; perceptual: 2.60 ± 0.86), both sets of negative photographs 
differed from the neutral photographs (mean valence: 5.75 ± 0.63; p<0.001). The latter had a 
low arousal level (mean: 3.70 ± 0.83) which did not differ significantly from the set of negative 
photographs, either conceptual (5.21 ± 0.99) or perceptual (5.76 ± 0.63). The neutral 
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photographs showing peaceful animals, streets, unknown athletes and so on, did not overtly 
express any emotion. The perceptual emotional photographs featured injured or dangerous 
animals, car crashes and so on, while the conceptual emotional photographs contained scenes of 
crying or prostrated children/adolescents, portrayed adults wearing evil facial expressions or 
pretending to slap a child/adolescent.  
We administered two visual tasks in order to test the effect of emotion on memory: an oddball 
paradigm intended to test attention, and a recognition task (Fig. 1). The oddball paradigm also 
constituted the incidental encoding phase for the subsequent test. Hence, the 32 photographs 
shown during this encoding phase also served as targets in the subsequent recognition memory 
task. 
 
 
2.3 Procedure 
 
The two tasks were constructed using E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, 
PA) which permits both item presentation and data collection (speed and/or accuracy). The 
Oddball paradigm featured four types of stimuli: 162 colored geometric figures (83.5% of the 
items), 12 neutral photographs (6.3%), 10 moderately negative perceptual photographs (5.1%) 
and 10 moderately negative conceptual photographs (5.1%). Stimulus duration was 1500ms, 
followed by an inter-stimulus interval of 2000ms (gray screen for 1500ms and fixation cross 
displayed in the center of a gray screen for 500ms). The interval between two successive 
photographs was randomized, although they were separated by at least five geometric figures. 
Participants were required to identify the images as quickly as possible, pressing on letter “L” of 
a keyboard with their right index for real scenes and letter “S” with their left index for geometric 
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figures. Geometric figures constituted a reference condition, enabling us to register a motor 
response time (RT).  
We collected three RT ratios: negative perceptual, negative conceptual and neutral. Each ratio 
reflected the difference between the time taken to process the scenes and the time taken to 
process the geometric figures. The ratio was calculated as follows: (scenes - geometric figures) / 
geometric figures. 
The recognition task assessed recollection abilities using the Remember/Know paradigm 
(Gardiner, 2001). Participants performed a yes/no recognition task, with keypress responses, 
featuring all the targets provided during the oddball, intermingled with new distractors. Each 
scene remained on the screen until the participant had either recognized or rejected an item. Each 
“yes” response triggered the display of a comic trip comprising three smileys representing “I 
remember”, “I know”, and “I guess” answers. Each type of response was carefully described, in 
order to ensure that the adolescents understood every concept. Thus, “I guess” would be chosen if 
they were not sure of their answer, while “I know” and “I remember” would be chosen when 
children were certain. However, while “I know” corresponded to the retrieval of a scene without 
any specific details about the encoded episode, “I remember” corresponded to the retrieval of a 
scene accompanied by a “mental journey back into the past,” permitting the encoded episode to 
be relived and phenomenological details retrieved. Participants were required to indicate their 
responses using three different keypresses, one for each kind of consciousness. Unlike the 
oddball task, accuracy was the only constraint for the recognition task and the experimenter 
informed participants that there was no right or wrong answer for the consciousness task. This 
part of the test just provided an informative qualitative indicator of actual recognition. For this 
task, we calculated an accuracy score (Hits) for target and distractors and two scores reflecting 
recollection for every target correctly recognized that distinguishes between recollection 
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(Remember responses / encoded associations; R) and familiarity (K/1-R, where K = Know 
responses / encoded associations). 
 
 
2.4 Statistical analyses 
 
2.4.1 Typically developing  adolescents 
Statistics were computed with SAS 9.1.3 Institute Software NPAR1WAY procedure. We 
conducted statistical analyses on typically developing adolescents. First, we verified the absence 
of age and gender effects by conducting two analyses: (1) an ANOVA on each measure, with 
gender as a between-subject factor and (2) a backward regression (p=0.05) on the different 
measures, with age and age2 to test a nonlinear effect of age on performances. Second, we 
performed an ANOVA (generalized linear model; GLM) on the whole group with Tukey’s 
adjustment for multiple comparisons (HSD) for each of the three tasks. 
 
2.4.2 Adolescents with PTSD 
Taking into account the small sample size of our population, we compared each subgroup of 
patients to controls by conducting non parametric analyses. We used Kruskal-Wallis test for 
multiple comparisons and Mann-Withney for two-sample t-tests, with the Monte Carlo 
permutation estimation of p values. 
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3. Results 
 
3.1 Oddball paradigm 
 
For the oddball task, analyses were performed on the three RT ratios: negative perceptual, 
negative conceptual and neutral.  
 
3.1.1 Typically developing  adolescents 
For this task, nine participants were excluded from the analyses (N=55): two because 
responses had not been recorded, one because performances were two standard deviations below 
the mean and six because they responded more slowly to geometric figures than to real scenes, 
perhaps revealing a declining concentration in the case of repeated geometric figure. The one-
way ANOVA (emotion: negative perceptual, negative conceptual, and neutral) showed that 
emotion tended to affect response speeds (F(2, 106) = 2.6; p = 0.07). Adolescents tend to be 
slower for negative perceptual scenes (Fig. 2) compared to neutral scenes (p = 0.07), but not for 
conceptual scenes.  
 
3.1.2 Adolescents with PTSD 
Comparisons between controls and PTSD+ revealed significant differences in response speed 
for neutral conceptual scenes (p=0.02) and negative conceptual scenes (p=0.03): controls were 
slower than PTSD+ for these two kinds of scenes. There was no difference for negative 
perceptual scenes (p=0.2, Fig. 3). There was no effect of items for the PTSD+ (p=0.44). 
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Comparisons between controls and PTSD- revealed significant differences for neutral (p<0.001), 
negative conceptual (p=0.002) and negative perceptual scenes (p<0.001). There was no effect of 
item for the PTSD- (p=0.95). 
+++ Insert Fig. 3 Here +++ 
 
 
 
3.2 Recognition task 
 
3.2.1 Typically developing  adolescents 
For this task, six participants were excluded from the statistical analysis: data had not been 
recorded for four of them, while two others had performances below chance level. Results for the 
recognition task are shown on Table 1. The two-way ANOVA (status: target, distractor; emotion: 
negative conceptual, negative perceptual, neutral) performed on hits revealed a main effect of 
status (F(1, 56)=6.33; p=0.01) indicating that targets were better recognized than distractors. We 
also observed a main effect of emotion (F(2, 122)=13.65; p<0.0001): negative conceptual scenes 
generated the lowest performances compared to neutral scenes (p<0.001) and negative perceptual 
ones (p<0.0001). There was a significant interaction between status and valence (F(2, 
112)=22.66; p<0.0001), as negative conceptual controls were the least well categorized, i.e. 
correctly rejected.  
The ANOVA on Recollection scores was not significant (p=0.1). However, negative 
perceptual scenes tended to be more closely associated with recollection than neutral scenes (p = 
.08). No significant effect was observed for Familiarity scores.  
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3.2.2 Adolescents with PTSD 
Comparisons between PTSD+ and controls showed no significant differences between groups 
for any condition (Table 2a). A significant effect of emotion within the patient group appeared 
(p<0.001). Negative perceptual (p=0.003) and neutral distractors (p<0.0001) were better rejected 
than negative conceptual ones. Finally, negative conceptual scenes were better recognized as 
targets than as distracters (p=0.003). In contrast, neutral scenes were better recognized as 
distracters than as targets (p=0.05). 
Comparisons between PTSD- and controls showed significant difference for negative perceptual 
targets (p=0.0351) and negative conceptual distractors (p=0.04). Patients recognized less negative 
perceptual targets and produced more false negative conceptual recognitions than controls. 
Within-group comparisons revealed a significant effect of emotion on distracters (p=0.013). 
Negative perceptual (p=0.01) and neutral distractors (p<0.0001) were better rejected than 
negative conceptual ones. Moreover, neutral distractors were better rejected than negative 
perceptual ones (p=0.04). Finally, negative conceptual scenes were better recognized as targets 
than as distracters (p=0.05). In contrast, neutral scenes were better recognized as distracters than 
as targets (p=0.003). 
Concerning Recollection and Familiarity, significant differences between PTSD- and controls 
were detected for negative conceptual (p=0.02) and negative perceptual (p=0.05) scenes. Patients 
produced less recollective judgments than controls (Table 2b).  
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the influence of bottom-up and top-down 
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processes on memory in adolescents with PTSD. These two processes may participate, or even be 
central, to induce the opposite effects observed in episodic memory, i.e. vivid traumatic 
memories and an overgeneralization of non traumatic personal memories.  
Until now, most studies have focused on valence and arousal properties of the information. 
Our results provide evidence of another essential dimension that needs to be considered in the 
general population and in PTSD, that is, the perceptual versus conceptual properties of the 
emotional stimulus. We tested the putative differential effects on memory both at encoding, by 
means of an attentional task (oddball paradigm), and at retrieval, using explicit (recognition) 
memory tasks.  
 
 
4.1 Attentional processing 
 
Concerning healthy adolescents’ performances on the oddball paradigm, moderately negative 
perceptual scenes captured more attention at encoding than moderately negative conceptual 
scenes or neutral ones. This negative bias effect confirms previous studies showing that the 
perception of moderate emotions has an effect on memory. It is well documented that the 
attentional bias to negative information induces errors (Schimmack and Derryberry, 2005) or 
slows down the processing of a concomitant task (Algom et al., 2004), as in the present case 
(judgment of perceptual properties). The existence of this negative bias has been confirmed by 
electrophysiological studies, showing early attentional capture (Olofsson et al., Polich, 2008) and 
a long-lasting effect of negative emotion, persisting for approximately 1000ms after picture offset 
(Hajcak and Olvet, 2008). It is unlikely that the attentional capture observed in the present study 
results from a difference in arousal between the negative perceptual and neutral scenes, as they 
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are matched for arousal level. Consequently, it is the content of the scenes (i.e., the presence of 
the perceptual details) that produces interference effects. This phenomenon is concordant with the 
automatic vigilance hypothesis recently developed by Estes and Adelman (2008) in adults.  
However, negative conceptual scenes did not affect attention to the same extent as negative 
perceptual items did. First, even if the global meaning of the conceptual scene may be largely 
threatening, details of the negative conceptual scenes by themselves are less directly threatening 
than those contained in the perceptual scenes (e.g., fangs in an open mouth of a reptile versus a 
man looking furious with a hand up). Second, attention is focused on the interpretation of the 
scene rather than on external aversive stimuli.  
Concerning adolescents with PTSD, the different patterns reflect the clinical heterogeneity of 
PTSD patients (van der Kolk, 2006; Elhai, 2011). The first group of patients (PTSD+, faster than 
controls) is characterized by an accelerated cognitive processing suggesting that either they did 
not pay much attention to real scenes or they actively shift from the scenes, except for negative 
perceptual ones. The second group (PTSD-, slower than controls) shows an impairment of 
attention independently of the kind of stimulus (neutral or emotional): they have difficulties to 
disengage their attention from geometric figures to process real scenes. These results are unlikely 
due to general slowness because performances are expressed as ratios, excluding an interpretation 
based on low response speed for geometric figures. They probably have difficulties in switching 
which may be linked to inhibition processes. This hypothesis needs to be tested further with 
specific cognitive tasks.  
 
 
4.2 Explicit memory 
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Concerning the patterns of performance obtained in the healthy group, we can conclude that 
the negative emotion generated by both the perceptual and conceptual properties of the pictures 
have opposite effects on explicit memory. The feeling of recollection or the vividness of negative 
traces is increased in the case of negative emotional perceptual memories compared to neutral 
ones, although their accuracy is comparable. As recently demonstrated by Rimmele et al. (2011), 
negative stimuli may increase subjective recollection with no effect on accuracy. This can be 
explained by the fact that these negative stimuli provoke an attentional capture and, thus, exert a 
significant positive effect on episodic memory, enhancing the recollection of item-specific 
features or local stimulus details. These results support the prediction of emotional enhancement 
of memory in the attention mediation hypothesis formulated by Talmi et al. (2008) related to the 
emotional distinctiveness heuristic hypothesis formulated by Schacter et al. (2007).  
Negative emotion may also promote the production of false memories based on meaning 
similarities in particular conditions (Brainerd et al., 2008). This phenomenon supposes that 
emotion serves as an organizational factor in memory and may enhance false recognition 
comparable to the emotional gist of the target (Howe et al., 2010).  
We show that the increase of distinctiveness or false memory may depend on the main 
qualities of the process of emotion generation, relying either on perceptual properties or on 
semantic qualities. Hence, focusing on general information or on the feeling induced by negative 
conceptual targets, create gist traces and subsequently an increased rate of false memories by 
leading to a confusion between the presented and unshown pictures. Brainerd et al. (2008) report 
a high level of false memories associated with negative emotion for verbal materials and 
attributed this phenomenon to the absence of verbatim memories or episodic details of true items. 
In the present study, the adolescents produced more false memories for negative conceptual 
distractors than for neutral ones. Moreover, these negative false memories are not associated with 
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modifications in the recollection process, which only occur in case of negative perceptual 
memories.  
Concerning patients, the heterogeneity observed during the oddball task leads to distinctive 
performances in explicit memory. In particular, patients with the lowest performances did not 
benefit from the distinctiveness associated with negative perceptual scenes to enhance memory 
performances. This can be linked to the fact that they demonstrated an attentional deficit that did 
not allow them to significantly encode these scenes. Emotion may also be less easily triggered by 
emotional cues, impairing the process of recollection. This state reflects what is also clinically 
described as “emotional numbing” which corresponds to an excess of overgeneralized memories. 
Several studies have also found evidence of overgeneral memory in PTSD (Moore and Zoellner, 
2007) whose answers usually do not refer to a specific episode, precisely localized in time and 
space. Instead, they either refer to an extended or a vaguely defined period or describe habits or 
categories of events with quite broad descriptions. It has been hypothesized that overgeneral 
memories protect the patient from the unpleasant recall of painful or even traumatic events 
(Williams et al., 2007). Thus, contrary to intrusive recollection, events of the past tend to be 
recollected without emotionality or with low arousal. This trend clinically corresponds to part of 
the C criterion of PTSD, i.e. “numbing of general responsiveness” according to the DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  
This is associated with an elevated level of false recognition for negative conceptual control 
stimuli that confirms results from other studies (Jelinek et al., 2009). Moreover, this result is only 
observed for conceptual scenes suggesting that difficulties in top-down control enable patients 
with attentional difficulties to reject conceptual scenes they have never seen.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
Taking into account the two present studies, emotion generation may affect memory through 
a continuous completion between a bottom-up approach which uses the perceptual features of the 
information and a top-down approach which uses general knowledge. Top-down processes or 
conceptual interpretation includes the observation of another person’s emotional state that will 
activate our own representation of that state and/or a self-generated negative emotion. This 
process requires a great sensitivity to information, including emotion, and is crucial in the 
development of social understanding and positive social behaviors. 
Our findings suggest a differential effect of top-down and bottom-up processes on memory in 
adolescent psychiatric disorders. The top-down control, which is immature during adolescence 
and impaired in PTSD, may have a role in the disorganization in time and, hence, in the sense of 
continuity and self -coherence. Traumatic memories have an impact on patients’ daily life due to 
their intrusive nature. Here, we show that traumatic memories have also a permanent impact on 
the capacity to process efficiently daily emotional material when a conceptual interpretation is 
required. For instance, in the case of repeated negative experiences, enhancement of similarity 
judgments may increase the confusion between these different experiences which may prevent 
them from extracting the chronology of each individual personal event. Normally, details of a 
specific event are accessed via top-down processes in a forward temporal order, after the first 
details or sequences have been remembered (Burt et al., 1995). This confusion in time may favor 
a generalized distrust or hostility triggered by similar stimuli. Hence, the past may be considered 
as the present in PTSD with a specific but permanent interference on both personality and 
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cognitive functioning. It would be interesting to examine, in further studies, the neural networks 
recruited by these top-down and bottom-up processes and the associated connectivity between the 
activated brain regions. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Fig.1. Schematic illustration of the experimental design depicting the three types of stimulus 
scenes and two memory phases. Targets scenes are presented during the oddball paradigm and 
during the recognition task mingled with new unstudied controls.  
 
Fig.2. Changes in RTs (ratio) for neutral, negative conceptual and negative perceptual scenes, 
compared to the reference conditions in the oddball paradigm (mean ± SD). 
 
Fig. 3. Changes in RTs (ratio) in the three groups of adolescents for neutral, negative conceptual 
and negative perceptual scenes, compared to the reference conditions in the oddball paradigm 
(mean ± SD). 
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Table 1 
Mean (± SD) performances of typically developing adolescents on the recognition task. 
 Hits Recollection Familiarity 
 Targets (%) Distractors (%)   
Neutral  94.25 (7.68) 98.13 (4.14) 0.53 (0.33) 0.62 (0.39) 
Negative conceptual 95.86 (6.50) 86.90 (8.20) 0.59 (0.29) 0.65 (0.40) 
Negative perceptual 95.51 (9.02) 94.65 (7.54) 0.65 (0.28) 0.60 (0.43) 
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Table 2a 
 Mean (± SD) performances on the recognition task for the two subgroups of patients and 
controls. 
 Controls (%) PTSD+ PTSD- Statistical 
Comparisons  
Targets (%)     
    Neutral  91.67 (11.78) 92.94 (10.11) 80.55 (22.57)  
    Negative conceptual 97.50 (4.42) 96.92 (4.80) 88.33 (18)  
    Negative perceptual 95 (7.22) 97.69 (4.38) 86.67 (13.7) PTSD-<controls 
Distractors (%)     
    Neutral  99.30 (2.35) 98.71 (3.13) 97.91 (3.77)  
    Negative conceptual 87.91 (7.21) 85.38 (11.98) 81.67 (11.15) PTSD-<controls 
    Negative perceptual 96.25 (5.76) 96.15 (6.5) 91.67 (10.3)  
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Table 2b 
Mean (± SD) performances on the recollection and familiarity judgments for the two subgroups 
of patients and controls. 
 Controls (%) PTSD+ PTSD- Statistical 
Comparisons  
Recollection      
    Neutral  0.52 (0.37) 0.63 (0.29) 0.39 (0.40)  
    Negative conceptual 0.68 (0.26) 0.73 (0.16) 0.50 (0.20) PTSD-<controls 
    Negative perceptual 0.68 (0.29) 0.72 (0.20) 0.58 (0.37) PTSD-<controls 
Familiarity      
    Neutral  0.52 (0.39) 0.52 (0.37) 0.39 (0.40)  
    Negative conceptual 0.55 (0.43) 0.62 (0.41) 0.74 (0.28)  
    Negative perceptual 0.50 (0.42) 0.51 (0.44) 0.58 (0.37)  
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